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Introduction
Distinction is passé. Thus argue many sociological studies since Peterson and Simkus (1992) first proclaimed the emergence of the 'cultural omnivore' (Van Eijck & Knulst 2005) . Instead, it has now become a badge of honour to be eclectic in one's cultural 2 preferences and explicitly not be seen as a cultural 'snob' (Bennett et al, 2009 ). Rather than withdrawing into rarefied cultural domains, contemporary elites now apparently enjoy both consecrated tastes and culture traditionally regarded as popular and lowbrow.
However, one cultural form consistently overlooked in such studies is comedy.
Traditionally considered déclassé in many Western countries, comedy is now arguably an upwardly mobile art, boasting considerable cultural prestige and attracting diverse audiences. Moreover, our studies in Britain and the Netherlands have revealed that comedy taste is strongly class-specific (Friedman 2011; Kuipers 2006a ). We found that comedy consumers are nothing like the eclectic, nonjudgmental consumers described in other studies. Comedy lovers with high cultural capital may be omnivorous in their general taste for pop-culture, but their specific comic preferences reveal they are often strongly dismissive of lowbrow comedy. In other words, these omnivores are also snobs. This paper further explores this intriguing finding by focusing on the relation between comedy tastes and symbolic boundaries, drawing on a field analytical perspective. Following Lamont's (1992) critique of Bourdieu's distinction theory, however, we do not assume that taste differences automatically translate into hierarchical boundaries. Whether this happens depends, first, on whether taste differences are constructed as symbolically meaningful and, second, whether there is societal agreement over cultural legitimacy. In other words: it requires the public to accept the value of certain people's cultural judgements.
This article, therefore, has a dual aim. First, it aims to unravel the relation between taste differences and symbolic boundaries -namely how do differences in comedy taste 'translate' into markers of one's cultural capital? And then, comparing 3 interviews in Britain and the Netherlands, how does this differ cross-nationally?
Although many studies suggest that processes of class distinction and field dynamics are nationally specific (cf. Janssen et al., 2011) , qualitative sociological studies of taste, class and cultural hierarchy are usually single-country studies.
Secondly, we aim to show how processes of boundary-drawing may be specific to particular cultural fields. Both Bourdieusian studies of distinction and the competing paradigm of omnivore studies assume that cultural consumers approach all culture with the same dispositions. However, our analysis suggests that the comedy field has its own particular logic and may be a more potent marker of boundaries than other cultural forms. As one informant noted, 'there's something fundamental about what makes you laugh'.
Symbolic Boundaries and Comedy
Central to understandings of how symbolic boundaries intersect with inequality has been the work of Bourdieu (1984) . Bourdieu argued that children from the dominant middle and upper-middle classes are inculcated with dispositions that orientate them towards 'legitimate' cultural tastes and a cultivated way of seeing art -described as the 'disinterested aesthetic disposition' (Bourdieu, 1984: 28-42) . When these highbrow tastes are activated in social life they become a form of 'cultural capital', acting as potent signals of membership in a high status group and symbolic distance from those outside. Each application of highbrow taste thus becomes an act of symbolic violence against dominated groups, who accept the authority of a cultural hierarchy defined and imposed by the dominant.
Yet Bourdieu argued that the drawing of symbolic boundaries is rarely explicit or intentional. Instead, within the cultural field, hierarchy acts as an automatic sorting mechanism, 'automatically classified and classifying, rank ordered and rank ordering' (Bourdieu, 1984: 223) . Thus simply to express 'the certainty of one's own value…implies condemnation of all other ways of being and doing' (Bourdieu, 1984: 223).
However, since the publication of Distinction many have questioned whether the cultural field resembles a zero-sum Bourdieusian hierarchy. Lamont (1992) argued that the process by which taste differences produce inequality is more complex than Bourdieu implied. She noted that boundaries can only be said to generate inequality and exclusion when cultural legitimacy is 'widely agreed upon' (Lamont & Lareau, 1988: 152 (Peterson & Kern, 1996; Featherstone, 1996) . Some even argue that contemporary markers of distinction actually involve refraining from drawing boundaries (Warde et al., 1999; Bellevance, 2008) . Indeed, such eclecticism has been connected to various social benefits, like enhanced communication with diverse groups (Erickson, 1996) or greater political tolerance (Bryson, 1996) .
In Britain and the Netherlands, this shift has been bolstered by the influential work of Bennett et al. (2009) and Van Eijck (Van Eijck & Knulst, 2005) . These authors argue that snobbery and boundary-claiming among the British and Dutch middle classes has all but disappeared. Van Eijk and Knulst (2005: 527) note that younger generations of 5 the Dutch middle class are no longer socialised with a 'firm belief in the supremacy of highbrow culture' and therefore the profits to be gleaned from snobbery are negligible. In a British context Bennett et al. (2009: 194) go further, observing a 'more or less total elimination of hints of snobbishness towards other social classes'. Moreover, they posit that it has now become a 'badge of honour' to embrace a 'spirit of openness' in one's cultural preferences (189).
Despite the empirical weight of such large-scale studies, there is not complete sociological consensus. For example, more focused British studies have uncovered that class-inflected taste boundaries persist (Lawler, 2005; Harwood & Yar, 2006) .
Looking at discussions of the working-class in British media, Lawler (2005) argues that many such narratives are characterised by a distinct middle-class 'disgust' at working-class existence. However, 'objective' economic or occupational class markers are rarely invoked in expressions of disapproval. Instead, disdainful traits are presented as the outcome of pathological cultural tastes and lifestyles.
Other authors have pointed out that the literature on omnivorousness and the erosion of cultural boundaries wrongly assumes that this is occurring in all cultural fields. While the traditional highbrow-lowbrow divide may be eroding, these authors counter that this has not led to the disappearance of stratified tastes (Janssen et al. 2011 ). On the contrary, there is strong evidence that high-low taste distinctions are now being detected within the popular arts. In particular, some subgenres of popular arts, like alternative rock music (Regev, 1994) or arthouse films (Bauman, 2001) are described as 'upwardly mobile', having acquired higher status and elite audiences.
We argue here that comedy should be added to this list of upwardly mobile art. Our own studies in Britain (Friedman, 2011) and the Netherlands (Kuipers, 2006a (Kuipers, , 2006b ) have both demonstrated strong cleavages in comedy taste. More specifically, they found that the higher middle classes, possessing higher education and more cultural capital, generally exhibited tastes for highbrow comedy and rejected anything lowbrow, whereas the working and lower middle classes preferred more lowbrow comedy and were ambivalent about highbrow comedy.
Furthermore, we uncovered similar class differences in styles of comic appreciation. While the styles of the Dutch and British working (and lower middle) class revolved around notions of comedy as funny, pleasurable and sociable, middle class respondents distanced themselves from this by emphasising that comedy should never just be funny. These respondents stressed the value of complex and original comedy, suggesting that to 'work' for one's laughter leads to higher levels of comic appreciation.
Yet, while both studies uncovered salient divisions in comic appreciation, these distinctions do not necessarily constitute symbolic boundaries. To reiterate Lamont's (1992) point, the significance of taste differences must be explicitly interrogated rather than implicitly assumed, particularly if one wants to understand the potential link between taste and symbolic violence. This, then, neatly captures what we aim to investigate: how taste differences relate to symbolic boundaries; and how symbolic boundaries relate specifically to comedy and humour.
Outline of the Research
We draw upon data from two mixed-methods studies of comedy taste, one conducted in the Netherlands in 1997-9 and one in Britain in 2009. The British study consisted of a survey (n = 901) and 24 follow-up interviews, the Dutch study a survey (n = 340) and 66 interviews. Here we concentrate on interview data from both studies.
The Dutch research focused on comedy and humour in everyday life, and used two interview samples. 34 interviews were conducted with people who liked jokes 7 and joke-telling, leading to an unusual interview pool consisting mainly of working and lower middle class men. The British sample, and the second Dutch sample of 32 respondents, was based on a theoretically defined subsample of original survey respondents. Respondents were chosen primarily to reflect the demographic composition of the population. For more detail on methodologies see Friedman (2011) and Kuipers (2006a) .
Comparing Dutch and British comedy audiences is useful, first, because sociological debates on taste and stratification are similar in both countries. Moreover, comedy is an important cultural field in both, with comedians achieving high public visibility and often becoming important public figures. Both nations also share certain comedy tastes, with several Dutch and British comedians enjoying crossover success (Logan, 2010) 1 . Finally, there are interesting historical similarities. During the 1970s and 1980s both countries witnessed the emergence of alternative comedy, which combined transgressive humour with left-wing social critique, and catered mainly to educated younger audiences (Wilmut, 1989; Hanenberg & Verhallen 2006) . Beside this 'intellectual' alternative, both countries also have a longstanding tradition of more popular performance comedy.
The main objective of the interviews was to understand respondents' aesthetic orientation to comedy and humour, including their comedy dislikes. To ensure systematic interview analysis we looked for three types of utterances typical of boundary drawing: First, we searched for explicit delineations of highbrow and lowbrow humour. Second, we marked instances where people rejected specific types of comedy, and looked at the reasons for rejection: aesthetic, moral, social, or other.
Third, we marked judgments of other people on the basis of their comedy taste.
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These elements were analyzed separately for respondents with high (HCC) and low (LCC) cultural capital. We focused on levels of cultural capital since this was the main determinant of comedy taste. In the Dutch study, cultural capital was operationalized rather straightforwardly: all people with finished tertiary education were considered HCC. In the British study cultural capital 'resources' were calculated using equally weighted measures for social origin (parental occupation and education), education and occupation.
2
High Cultural Capital Boundary Construction

Aesthetic Boundaries
Considering the literature on eroding symbolic boundaries, HCC boundary-marking on the basis of comedy taste is surprisingly strong in Britain and the Netherlands. 
But do you also tend to make a high-low distinction in the humour?
[snickers] 
Moral Boundaries
Our analysis of HCC dislikes shows that lowbrow comedy taste does not just invoke aesthetic boundaries, but also moral borders. For example, when British HCC respondents talk about 'trad' comedians -stand-ups synonymous with the workingmen's club circuit -their first weapon of denigration is the morally transgressive element of this comedy, which they consider 'aggressive', 'hostile' and 'bullying'.
Indeed, in both countries, there is a strong sense that comedy targeted at traditionally marginalised groups, like women, ethnic minorities and homosexuals is morally wrong:
It was, well, macho-ish. So I wasn't really happy sitting there. The whole way of looking at women, and relations with men, I didn't find that agreeable -not All I would need to hear is 'I went to see Roy 'Chubby' Brown last week, it was magic' and I would want to glass them. I wouldn't. I would probably have a short conversation and then get the fuck out of their company. But the fact that they didn't have the wits, the sensitivity, to see that that kind of bullying is disgusting tells me that they are a pathetic race and they need to crawl back Reaching beyond the judgments of certain comedians or comic styles, then, these quotes suggest that comedy's potency has more to do with the pivotal role played by humour and laughter in everyday life. In particular, they bring out the importance of humour in shaping friendships and relationships.
As Collins (2004 , cf. Kuipers 2009 ) has noted, humour and laughter play a crucial role in everyday 'interaction rituals'. In everyday life people gravitate towards, and form durable bonds with, others whom they can create positive emotional energy.
Often, the successful exchange of laughter is central to this. The discovery of shared humour is a sign of similarity; and similarity breeds emotional closeness and trust.
Inversely though, failure to share humour and laughter is often an explicit sign of not being 'on the same wavelength'.
It may be precisely because comedy has this ability to create social bonds, through the proxy of humour and laughter, that it has a heightened capacity to reveal strong symbolic boundaries. Thus, comedy taste is indeed 'something fundamental': via the connection with everyday humour and laughter, it is directly related to personhood. Moreover, this connection between comedy, everyday humour, and personhood also suggests that comedy taste may act as a powerful form of symbolic violence -'the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder' (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979: xiii) . Therefore, we now turn to our informants with less cultural capital. To what extent are these people, whose comedy tastes are so strongly disparaged, excluded or hurt by this rejection? And do they draw symbolic boundaries on the basis of comedy taste?
Low Cultural Capital Boundary-Drawing?
Openness, Puzzlement and Dejection
Both the British and the Dutch study found that respondents from LCC backgrounds have fewer comedy dislikes and know fewer comedians than HCC respondents.
Following from this, LCC respondents are also less likely to draw boundaries on the basis of comedy taste. They are more accepting of differences in comedy taste, and less likely to see their own comedy taste as superior: It's nothing major like. Like if someone absolutely loved Stewart Lee, thought he is the best thing since sliced bread, I would say ok fair enough, because I haven't really seen enough of him. It wouldn't really change anything anyway (UK: DJ).
In this passage we see another important distinction between these informants and HCC interviewees. People with low cultural capital often admit they didn't know a comedian well enough to judge, or don't 'get' certain humour:
Freek de Jonge. No it's more that I just don't follow. And he [husband] will be there laughing and I say: come on, tell me, because half of it I just -It's just going to quick, I have missed half it and then I think, I simply won't bother to try to follow it, because I just don't think it's interesting enough. If it is costing me too much to think (NL: Claire).
These quotes show a general disinterest in 'taste talk' among LCC informants.
Not only are they unwilling to judge on the basis of taste; they attach limited importance to talking about, or presenting themselves, through taste. This unwillingness to judge others may reflect a lack of confidence or a sense of cultural inferiority. Although earlier in his interview British LCC respondent DJ remarks that he dislikes Stewart Lee ('he is just very patronising'), in the quote above he still doesn't draw any boundary with those who like Lee. Similarly, Claire is somewhat stung by her husband liking Freek de Jonge, but concludes that 'she simply won't bother'. In the end, both reserve judgment, DJ because he hasn't 'really seen enough', Claire because 'it is costing her too much'. This indicates a tension between seeing taste as trivial preference and an awareness of positioning in the cultural hierarchy.
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The absence of boundary drawing among LCC informants often coincides with a dejected or puzzled attitude towards highbrow comedy:
Van Kooten and de Bie 15 . It could be that is was too highbrow for me. I don't know. Or they're too sharp or something. I didn't like them. (NL: Ton)
I was once in a show called Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead. And I learnt the lines and delivered the lines just like the director told me. And it was only until the show night when people were laughing that I knew which bits were funny because unfortunately it was beyond me. I didn't have that education (UK: Ian)
In both countries, many LCC informants discuss highbrow comedy in this despondent tone. They realize they do not possess the cultural capital to appreciate 'legitimate' comedy and underscore this by frequently using vertical metaphors:
'highbrow'; 'beyond me'; 'over my head'.
This marks a stark contrast with HCC respondents who often made strong judgments even when they hadn't even seen the comedian in question. Indeed, it arguably underscores one of Bourdieu's main points in Distinction (1984: 397-465), namely that there is a critical difference between the culturally privileged, who feel they have 'the right to speak' and pass judgment on others, and those with less cultural capital, who don't. The open and tolerant attitude of LCC informants, therefore, may be a result of necessity, rather than ideology.
Challenging the highbrow aesthetic
This asymmetric pattern of highbrow rejection versus lowbrow puzzlement seems very Bourdieusian: a strong cultural hierarchy upheld by symbolic boundaries and the lower classes lacking the aesthetic tools to challenge these boundaries. However, this is not the full story. Especially in the Netherlands, LCC informants sometimes explicitly reject (some) highbrow comedy (Kuipers, 2006: 99-119) . In demarcating such boundaries, these informants draw on various alternative 'repertoires of evaluation' (Lamont, 1992) . Often, rejections of HCC comedy are framed in terms of morality. In both countries, LCC informants object to a certain self-congratulatory smugness they perceive in highbrow comedy audiences: that one should not offend, swear or cuss in public (Kuipers, 2006a) . Second, we see traces of the same laissez-faire tolerance ('to each his own') noted above: LCC informants specifically object to attempts to set limits on other people's humour. This points to a highly charged area of contestation between the aesthetic values of HCC respondents and the moral LCC criteria of honesty and straightforwardness. However, because morality tends to be contested, moral evaluations do not easily convert into universal repertoires of evaluation. Hence, they may function as 'subcultural capital' with little currency beyond one's social class (Thornton, 1996) .
Both in the Netherlands and in Britain, LCC interviewees also sometimes draw on cultural-aesthetic repertoires to reject HCC comedy. Lowbrow comedy is generally explained through a popular aesthetic of fun, entertainment and sociability (Friedman, 2011 Crooswijk is Rotterdam's salt-of-the-earth neighbourhood and that's where I come from. I think Crooswijk, being the working-class district it is, has more humour than the gentlemen's hang-outs on the canals, don't you? (NL: Albert) Dutch LCC informants also spoke in pitying tones about people with more cultural capital, whom they felt to be 'stiff', 'sterile'. 'serious', 'yearning for diversion', and
'not being able to let go and have fun.' (Kuipers, 2006a: 72-73) .
Here, the restrained highbrow ethos is confronted with 'aesthetics of everyday life': sense of humour grounded in everyday experiences, an openness to sensory pleasures, and a firm conviction that humour and comedy is first and foremost about sociability. Fraser, Albert, and other critics of HCC seriousness draw on a somewhat idealized image of working class life, which they oppose to constrained, bookish, individualized, middle-class restrictions on 'having a laugh'. This raises the question of whether LCC boundary-drawing contains significant symbolic power. Similar to discussions about alternative notions of comic 'value', it may be that the aesthetic judgments of LCC respondents only convey status within their social group. As Lawler (2005: 443) suggests, 'working class disgust or contempt simply does not count: they lack the social authority to make their judgments stick'. Yet, this implies HCC respondents do have the authority to make their judgements stick, a conclusion not fully fully supported by our findings either.
Conclusion
According to prevailing sociological thought, the cultural snob is in terminal decline, replaced instead by a new generation of non-judgmental omnivores. While this may be accurate in some fields, it provides a misleading portrait of comedy. Examining patterns of comedy taste in Britain and the Netherlands, we find an arena marked by remarkably strong symbolic boundaries. In both countries, those with high cultural capital use comedy taste as a key tool in claiming social distance. A sense of aesthetic superiority underpins these claims, with HCC respondents explicitly judging inferior those who do not have the knowledge to decode highbrow comedy. Furthermore, the strength of this boundary is underlined by the manner in which -particularly in the British case -aesthetic judgments meld into moral and personal verdicts on the 'worth' of those with lowbrow taste. However, although HCC respondents draw strong boundaries on the basis of comedy taste, the sociological significance of these borders is hard to ascertain. Whether comedy taste functions as symbolic violence relies, firstly, on whether the legitimacy of HCC comedy tastes are 'widely agreed upon' and secondly, whether LCC respondents are excluded by HCC rejection. Yet in both countries neither mechanism is clear-cut. On the one hand, many LCC respondents -particularly in Britain -appear to accept the intrinsic cultural value of HCC comedy taste. This mainly manifests through 'self-elimination' (Bourdieu, 1984: 379) , whereby LCC respondents express despondency at HCC comedy and deliberately opt out of consuming. However, such deference is not uniform. 2 The Cultural Capital 'Score' was calculated with 'Education' on a scale of seven of 'highest completed'; 'Occupation' on a scale of nine corresponding to jobs emphasizing 'cultural skills'; 'Family Socialization' on both parents' education and both parents' occupation when respondent was 14. These measures were collapsed into a 5-point scale to make a score of 1-15. This is an updated version of that used by Holt (1997) .
